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Discussant's Response No. 2 to 
"Illegal Acts: What is The Auditor's Responsibility?" 
Frances M. McNair 
Mississippi State University 
When I agreed to discuss the paper by Dan Guy, Ray Whittington, and 
Don Neebes, I did not realize the task would be so difficult.  Commenting on 
a paper about SAS No. 54, written by drafters  of  the statement, is difficult 
enough, but then to follow  discussions by three of  the brightest accounting 
students at the University of  Kansas is really a chore. 
Even with the enactment of  SAS No. 54, the question of  what the auditor 
is responsible for  is still difficult  to answer. Does this standard answer the 
question or does it raise the question, "What is the Auditor Responsible 
For?" The standard increases the auditor's responsibility for  detection of  a 
client's illegal acts and it may be difficult  to determine where the responsi-
bility stops. 
Some of  the work that I have done recently has been in the area of  the 
accountant's liability and responsibility. Consequently, some of  my com-
ments concern the potential effect  that this new SAS No. 54 could have on 
the auditor in terms of  additional duties and liabilities. I would like to address 
four  areas of  concern: (1) the classification  of  illegal acts as direct or indirect; 
(2) potential increased liability; (3) interaction with other SASs; and (4) dis-
closure. 
Direct vs. Indirect Illegal Acts 
As discussed in the paper by the authors, illegal acts are divided into two 
categories. The auditor is prescribed different  degrees of  responsibility 
based upon the category in which the illegal act falls.  The prescribed degree 
of  care is much higher for  the first  category of  acts - those illegal acts that 
have a direct  and material  effect  on the financial  statement amounts. Since 
this category of  illegal acts would affect  the financial  statement amounts, the 
auditor should assess the risk that an illegal act may cause the financial  state-
ments to contain a material misstatement. Consequently, the auditor must 
design audit procedures to provide reasonable assurance of  detecting the il-
legal act. 
Much recent litigation has been based on the auditor's negligence when 
there was a failure  to discover and report management's errors and irregu-
larities, i.e., management fraud.  This same standard of  care required for  dis-
covery of  management's errors and irregularities is now required for  the 
discovery of  the client's direct effect  illegal acts. This means the auditor will 
have to understand the legal environment in which the client is operating in 
order to design procedures that would detect such offenses.  This will have 
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a direct impact on the auditing procedures, especially those designed to test 
the internal control procedures of  the client 
The detection of  the indirect effect  illegal acts as defined  in SAS No. 54 
may be much more difficult  than the detection of  the direct effect  illegal acts. 
These are acts that normally do not have a material effect  on the financial 
statement amounts. The auditor has a responsibility for  their discovery, but 
to a lesser degree than for  the discovery of  the direct effect  illegal acts. As is 
noted in the paper, except for  a few  examples given in the statement, differ-
entiating direct effect  illegal acts from  indirect effect  illegal acts is largely a 
matter of  auditor's judgment. There appears to be a very fine  line between 
the two types of  illegal acts, and in some cases the distinction may be nonex-
istent. For example, if  a contingent liability is identified  as a result of  an in-
direct effect  illegal act and a portion of  it is required to be accrued, then does 
it not become a direct effect  illegal act with the higher standard of  care? After 
all, this type of  act does have a direct effect  on the financial  statement amounts. 
It appears that the distinction between a direct effect  illegal act and an in-
direct effect  illegal act may be a source of  confusion  both to the accountant 
and to the public. If  an illegal act has occurred (regardless of  type), and it has 
a material effect  on the financial  statements, then it must be reflected  in the 
financial  statements. If  the illegal act is immaterial, then no disclosure of  the 
act is required to an outside party. However, can there be an illegal act of  any 
consequence not requiring disclosure? Even if  the act pertains to the opera-
tion of  the organization, the commission of  the illegal act can cause a legal li-
ability to accrue. The probability of  the act being discovered is not relevant; 
if  the act has been committed then the consequences must be considered. 
Some acts may not affect  a specific  line item on the financial  statements, 
but they could affect  the continuation of  the business. For example, if  an act 
has been committed that might cause an operating license to be revoked, this 
would affect  the ability of  the business to continue. If  this were the situation, 
then a going concern assessment must be made and disclosed if  the conse-
quences were severe enough. Defining  two categories of  illegal acts may serve 
to confuse  the auditor and possibly lead to more litigation. It appears that the 
auditor should look at the effect  of  the illegal act on the financial  statements 
and whether disclosure could affect  an investor's opinion. 
Although the standard prescribes a higher standard of  care than did SAS 
No. 17, one of  the purposes of  identifying  two classes of  illegal acts was to 
try to limit the auditor's responsibility. But has this been accomplished? The 
standard actually makes the auditor more responsible. Even if  the illegal act 
is related to the operating environment, if  it can have material effect  on the 
financial  statements or on the entity's operation, then is the auditor not re-
sponsible for  detection? Is the distinction between a direct effect  illegal act 
and an indirect effect  illegal act really helpful,  or does this provide a false  sense 
of  security for  the auditor? Could a more useful  test be developed? 
Legal liability 
How does this increased responsibility fit  with potential liability? SAS No. 
54 prescribes the same standard of  care for  direct effect  illegal acts as it does 
for  client's errors and irregularities in SAS No. 53. The litigious nature of  today's 
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environment makes the auditor more susceptible if  he is careless in his re-
sponsibility to detect client's illegal acts. The problem of  third party liability 
is a very real problem, as many accounting firms  know. 
The more liberal view of  auditor responsibility adopted by many of  the 
courts in the 1970s and 1980s proved to be costly to many accounting firms. 
While the opinions of  the courts do vary from  state to state, in general, a more 
liberal view was adopted with respect to third party liability. Many of  the courts 
took the position that clients had a duty to third parties, particularly if  the group 
was identifiable  and limited. This standard has the potential for  making the 
auditor liable for  the client's injurious illegal acts. 
One positive note however, is that a few  of  the court decisions in the late 
1980s and early in 1990 have tended to take a more conservative view of  third 
party liability. The Credit  Alliance  decision is one of  the more important de-
cisions in the 1980s.1 In Credit  Alliance,  the court took a more conservative 
approach and limited liability to third parties that were identified  prior to the 
engagement. A number of  other state courts have adopted this view in 1988 
and 1989. Also, early in 1990, in the Caparo 2 decision, the English House of 
Lords adopted a more conservative view similar to that taken in Credit  Alliance. 
Another interesting question that SAS No. 54 raises is the potential in-
volvement of  legal counsel in the audit process. Some actions may call for  an 
expert opinion as to whether a law has actually been violated and the impli-
cations of  the violation. While the accountant is not necessarily concerned 
with whether a specific  act is illegal per se, there must be a determination to 
measure impact on the financial  statements. For example, some of  the pro-
visions of  the Securities Act of  1933 are complex and violations may be very 
technical. 
The auditors' expertise also is at issue here. How familiar  with law and 
regulations must the auditor be in order to make a judgment about violations? 
If  the auditor does not have the degree of  competency required, does this 
mean the employment of  counsel may become a regular part of  the audit pro-
cedure in firms  where complex regulations apply? It appears that the poten-
tial is there to have legal counsel as a regular member of  the audit team. 
Interaction with Other SASs 
SAS No. 54 is related specifically  to a number of  the new SASs that were 
issued in 1988. The auditor's responsibility for  the detection of  client direct 
effect  illegal acts is the same as is required for  the detection of  client's errors 
and irregularities in SAS No. 53. As you know, SAS No. 53 has increased au-
ditor responsibility by requiring the auditor to design audit procedures to pro-
vide reasonable assurance of  detection. 
The duty of  the auditor to detect material misstatement as a result of  client's 
illegal acts and the risk assessment (both control and inherent risk) have a 
direct bearing on the substantive test that are to be performed.  If  the audi-
1Credit Alliance v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 483 N.E. 2d 110, N.Y. App. (1985). 
2CAPARO Industries v. Dickman, et al. (Touche Ross), English House of  Lords (1990). 
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tor fails  to consider the possibility of  illegal acts and their impact on the 
financial  statements, then the auditor may be setting himself  up for  a negli-
gence charge in the event of  subsequent problems. 
SAS No. 55, Considerations  of  the Internal  Control  Structure  in a Finan-
cial Statement  Audit,  is also impacted by SAS No. 54. The new internal con-
trol procedures require a higher degree of  understanding of  the company's 
internal control structure. The understanding of  the control environment is 
especially important in relation to detecting illegal acts. The control environment 
includes such factors  as management philosophy, the entity's organizational 
structure, and various external influences  that affect  the entity's operations 
and practices (such as requirements by legislative and regulatory bodies). 
As I mentioned earlier, a client illegal act could affect  the firms  ability to 
continue business which will cause a going concern evaluation under SAS 
No. 59. Obviously, a client illegal act will affect  audit procedures required by 
other SAS's, i.e., the design of  substantive procedures. These examples illustrate 
the far  reaching effect  of  SAS No. 54. 
Disclosure 
Normally the responsibility of  notifying  parties outside the clients orga-
nization of  an illegal act not reported in the financial  statements is the re-
sponsibility of  management. However, SAS No. 54, as well as recent court 
decisions, indicate that the auditor has a higher level of  responsibility for  re-
porting certain kinds of  misconduct. The new statement seems to fall  short 
in clarifying  the auditor's responsibility for  disclosure. It notes that in gen-
eral, the auditor has no responsibility to notify  parties outside of  the client's 
organization of  the illegal acts. However, it does suggest that circumstances 
may exist that would require disclosure to an outside party. The statement 
then lists several situations that may require disclosure, but still leaves the 
decision up to the judgment of  the auditor in the specific  situation. Some court 
decisions in the 1980s reinforce  and strengthen the disclosure requirement. 
For example, in the Rudolph  case, the court established its own disclosure 
standard.3 The court reasoned that it is not unreasonable to expect an ac-
countant to expose fraud  in certain circumstances. In Rudolph, the accoun-
tant had knowledge of  fraud  subsequent to the audit. The court stated "the 
accountant's information  is obviously superior to that of  the investors" and 
the auditor may have a duty to disclose. 
Other courts contend that absent some duty to disclose, accountants are 
not required to tattle on their clients. As the court noted in Baker, 4 liability 
depends on an existing duty to disclose. One question to be answered is does 
SAS No. 54 create a legal duty to disclose and if  so to what circumstances 
does it apply? Again, it would appear that if  the illegal act would impact the 
financial  statement amounts or change an investor's decision, then there 
3Rudolph v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 800 F. 2d 1040 (11 Cir. 1986), rehearing denied at 806 F. 
2d 1070 (1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 1604 (1987). 
4Baker v. Henderson, Franklin, Starnes and Hart, 757 F. 2d 490 (7th Cir. 1986). 
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already is a duty to disclose. In a 1988 case, allegations that the accounting 
firm  knew of  fraud  in partnership offering  material, but allowed use of  its name, 
led to a claim for  aiding and abetting.5 Could this also apply to illegal acts of 
clients known by the auditor but not disclosed? Auditors can also subject them 
selves to RICO suits for  merely being "associated with" an organization in-
volved with RICO violations.6 
Conclusion 
In conclusion, the implication of  this new SAS does raise some interest-
ing questions. As the authors point out, one way to handle the problem may 
be to contract separately for  compliance procedures. It appears that SAS No. 
54 has raised the level of  responsibility for  the detection and  disclosure of  a 
client's illegal act. This higher standard of  care has the potential of  creating 
an even more litigious environment for  the accountant. 
5Roberts v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 857 F. 2d 646 (9th Cir. 9/19/88). 
6Schact v. Brown, 711 F. 2d 1343 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 508, 509 (1983). 
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